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Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color
by Hannah Knight
Abstract: The question of identity has been one of the biggest
questions addressed to humanity. Whether in terms of a country, a
group or an individual, the exact definition is almost as difficult to
answer as to what constitutes a group. The Manchus, an ethnic
group in China, also faced this dilemma. It was an issue that lasted
throughout their entire time as rulers of the Qing Dynasty (16441911) and thereafter. Though the guidelines and group
characteristics changed throughout that period one aspect
remained clear: they did not sinicize with the Chinese Culture. At
the beginning of their rule, the Manchus implemented changes that
would transform the appearance of China, bringing it closer to the
identity that the world recognizes today. In the course of
examining three time periods, 1644, 1911, and the 1930’s, this
paper looks at the significant events of the period, the changing
aspects, and the Manchus and the Qing Imperial Court’s relations
with their greater Han Chinese subjects. The Manchus were
considered, at least to its newly conquered subjects, to be the
foreign (or more commonly used) “alien” force. Outnumbered, the
Manchus had every opportunity to assimilate, classifying
themselves as “Chinese” rather than the standard “Banner” or
Manchu. However, as this paper will exhibit through the very
definition of who the Manchus were, and the events that
surrounded them, as well as their poor relations with their nonbanner subjects, the Manchus remained separated from the Han
Chinese, continuously classifying themselves as Manchu until their
official recognition in 1949.
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Introduction
China is only for the Chinese. If this remark was made sixty years
ago, many would have agreed with this statement and moved on.
Upon recent discovery, this was not always the case. In 1949, the
Manchu identity officially became recognized as a minority ethnic
group (shaoshu minzu) within the People’s Republic of China.
Four years later, over two million registered as Manchus.1 Prior to
this event, many Manchus were thought to have either assimilated
into the majority Han Chinese culture during the Qing Dynasty
(1644-1911) or blended together with Japanese culture during the
Manchukuo period (1931-1945). Either way, the Manchus were a
small forgotten group among the majority. However, the Manchus
were a separate group with their own unique identity. This paper
will explore and map this identity throughout the course of the
Qing Dynasty and part of the Manchukuo period.2
By looking at three distinctive time periods in Manchu
History, (1644, 1911, and the 1930’s), this paper shows examples
of how, despite previously thought, the Manchu identity has never
disappeared, though it was given the opportunity. These chances
came in many forms as the small ethnic group from Manchuria
took over the large Han Chinese Culture of the Ming Dynasty,
faced European competition that presented the ruling ethnic group
in a poor light, a revolution whose goal was the elimination of the
Manchus, to finally face a controlling foreign government. There
were many chances for the Manchus to disappear, yet they
endured. Not only is it seen by the cultural traits that continued but
in the relationship with their conquered Han Chinese, or as this
paper will refer to them as the Han. If the Manchu identity
changed, it evolved to resemble a more modern identity, not a
Chinese one. So long as the Manchus claimed their identity, they
had not disappeared.
1

Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in
Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 42-43.
2
Throughout the course of the paper, Han will be interchangeably used with
Chinese and Manchu with Qing or banner people.
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Beginning: 1644
Before one can begin to see the evolution of the Manchus, one
must start at the beginning. There are often two sides to the process
by which a nation is formed. The first side offers a story based on
vast imagination, involving impressive tales of heroism and
mystical elements. The other side is commonly backed by tangible
evidence, which can be traced and checked. The origins of the
Manchu nation are no different. The mythical aspect tells the story
of three maidens who one day decide to descend from heaven in
order to bathe at a lake that lays at the foot of Mt. Bukuri. The
youngest of the three discovers a fruit placed on her clothing by a
heavenly messenger. Accidentally swallowing the fruit, the maiden
becomes pregnant and human, and gives birth to a son. When
asked his identity, the son claimed that his clan “descended from
heaven, is the Aisin Gioro. I have no father. My mother was the
third of heaven’s daughters… I was also a spirit of heaven above.”3
The son was said to have later become leader of the Jurchens, the
forerunners of the Manchus. His descendants would come to live
in the place where the Manchus’ first leader, Nurhaci emerged.4
For all of its glory and captivating storytelling, this narrative
remains a myth.
The myth of the Manchus’ origins not only served to
entertain, but to also claim ethnic authenticity for the nation. The
tale may be fictional, but the places and people involved are not.
Manchus who laid claim to the title of emperor also claimed
themselves to be descendants of the Aisin Gioro clan. The claim of
being Aisin Gioro connected one to the beginning of the Manchus
as well as to claiming favor from the heavens. Ethnic authenticity
is shown in name, but also location. The Odoli where the son’s
leadership was established was the same Odoli where Nurhaci rose
to power.5 A claim to the birthplace of the Manchus not only
brought ethnic authenticity but established the nation’s legitimacy
3

Ibid., 44-46.
Ibid., 46.
5
Ibid.
4
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as a separate ethnic group. Odoli was already recognized as part of
the Jurchen history (rulers of the Jin Dynasty). This established
geographical legitimacy. What is more is the boy’s way of
conception was his claim to his lineage of being from heaven. The
idea of heaven was very important in the Asian culture, just as was
Confucian belief of the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate of
Heaven is the belief that so long as the emperor was able to
maintain the well being of a nation, the right to rule was his. For
the Manchus, the ability to claim ties of such high elevation gave
the Manchu rulers the legitimacy they needed to rule.
Myths hold their own importance in history, yet they are
often quickly dismissed in favor of facts that can be proven. The
factual side of the Manchus origins begins with several tribes
rather than a single nation. Manchuria (the Northeastern Three
Provinces of modern day China), often fell into the hands of
foreign forces. Eventually the people of Manchuria would develop
into three main clans. Of these three, the main line of the Manchus
connects to a Tungus border tribe, known as the Ju-chens or
Jurchens.6 These tribes, as well as the neighboring territories, were
controlled by a feudal system. Though the feudal system had long
been in place, it left much to desire in the ability to control the
tribes. The weakening of the surrounding tribes left the opportunity
for one to assert his power and to get rid of the feudal system in the
process. That individual was Nurhaci (1559-1626). Inheriting the
tribal chief position of his own clan upon the death his father,
Nurhaci used his power to gain control over the rest of the tribes.7
How Nurhaci went from inheriting the rule over one tribe to the
formation of a nation lies in the decline the Haixi-Jianzhou
alliance, an alliance formed by Nurhaci’s Jianzhou Jurchen clan
and the Haixi tribes.8 The weakening of the tribes allowed Nurhaci
to seize the opportunity to assert his leadership over all the tribes in
6

Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and
Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire (New York: Octagon
Books, 1972), 23.
7
Ibid., 51.
8
Elliott, The Manchu Way, 54.
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the alliance.9 While the unification of the tribes began in the late
sixteenth century, a united Manchu regime did not fully appear
until 1616 when “Nurhaci proclaimed his regime as the Latter
Jin.”10 Nurhaci united the tribes, revealing his intentions when he
took the title of Khan. By claiming the title of Khan, Nurhaci
revealed his desire for imperial power.11 Nurhaci’s proclamation
was all he needed to convey his goal of expansion. However,
Nurhaci did not merely state his intensions. As soon as the
Manchurian tribes were brought under his control, Nurhaci moved
into China, bringing about the fall of the Ming, (which had lasted
from 1368 to 1644), leading to the rise of the Qing, in 1644.
Nurhaci may have been seen as the founding father of the
great Manchu nation, but its true strength did not blossom until the
rule of Hong Taiji (1592-1643). To further unite the tribes and gain
additional control, Hong Taiji followed the example of the
Chinese. Chinese dynasties were known to rule from the Dragon
Throne, through a complex and extensive bureaucratic network of
scholar-officials. Hong moved the Manchus away from the feudal
system to a bureaucratic system based on the Ming political
structure.12 Hong’s goal was not to remodel the image of the
Manchus in favor of the Chinese but gain a more centralized
control over the Manchus. A bureaucratic government gave Hong
Taiji the power to challenge the Ming. Unfortunately, the Ming
Emperor failed to see the level of threat the Manchus poised. As
Franz Michael points out, “in a letter of the Ming Emperor to
Chinese frontier officials the statement was made that the Manchus
were originally dependent; but their present status remained open.
They were simply rebels.”13 According to the Ming, the Manchus
were just another group of Chinese rebels. What they failed to
notice was that the Manchus were a “horse of a different color.”
9

Ibid., 56.
William Rowe, China's Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 15.
11
Michael, 51.
12
Rowe, 17.
13
Michael, 100.
10
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The Ming may have seen nothing more than a group of
rebels, but there were several ethnic traits that separated the
Manchus and the Han, which established the Manchu identity; the
first of these being their name. In 1635 the former Jurchen tribes
dropped all ties to their tribal past and used the term “Manchu” to
identify themselves.14 Some, such as Dorgon, the regent for the
Shunzhi emperor in 1644, believed “the empire is a single whole.
There are no distinctions between Manchus and Hans.”15 In reality,
it would be the differences between the Manchus and the Han that
would serve as a source of tension between the two groups.
Moving beyond their history and name, religion also became a
point of difference and a point of identity. Buddhism, Daoism,
Shamanism and to some extent, Confucianism came to be the
belief systems of China. Buddhism, Daoism, and especially
Confucianism were the religious systems of the Han Chinese and
were adopted. Yet shamanism remained the leading religion
among the Manchus.16 The religious leaders, shamans, were
individuals of unnatural ability, who were responsible for the
communication with spirits. Out of the two forms of shamanism,
primitive and domestic, the large majority of Manchus focused on
the domestic practice. Domestic shamanism was “liturgically based
sacrifices made to heaven and to the ancestors…”17 Shamanism
held elements, such as the ancestral, patrilineal sacrifices, that
closely resembled Confucian practices, which made the
introduction of shamanism into the Chinese culture easier.
Shamanism most importantly, provided a unity amongst the
Manchus with a belief system as its center. “We Manchus have our
own particular rites for honoring heaven.”18 The Yongzheng
emperor made it clear in the previous statement that all cultures
honor the heavens, but the Manchu nation had its own way. Its
similarity to the other religions had made its introduction into
14

Elliott, 63.
Ibid., 212.
16
Ibid., 235.
17
Ibid., 236.
18
Ibid., 241.
15
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Chinese culture easier. Shamanism, however, also showed the
differences between the Han and the Manchus; this would
ultimately create a barrier between the two.19
Religion was only a small factor in which the Manchus
sought to establish their identity and distinction from others. A
written script was also created to further strengthen their identity.
Manchu dialect had long been established, yet script was one area
in which it had not fully developed. “The Chinese write their own
speech, the Mongols write their own speech. Are you telling me
that it is better for us all to continue learning and writing a foreign
language than for you to find a way for us to write our own?”20
Extreme as they were, Nurhaci’s remarks served to enforce the
need to establish their own written script in order to dominate over
China. By mixing a Mongolian script with their own language, the
Manchus provided credibility to their identity as an ethnic group.
The Manchus now had a tool which marked their place in history
and acted as a means of communication. A written script became
an important part of the Manchu identity where deaths, weddings,
and names could be recorded.
Names also served as both an identifying and separating
factor especially with name changing. “The Emperor: You are a
Hanjun. Why do you have a Manchu name? Arsai: My original
name was Cui Zhilu. Since the time I was small, I have studied the
Qing language [i.e., Manchu], and so I took a Manchu name.”21
Name and language were often used to identify ones ethnicity. The
problem for this defendant was that he was commonly mistaken as
a Manchu, instead of Chinese, due to his ability to speak the
Manchu language and the origin of his name. Chinese and Manchu
names differed in a myriad of ways. Chinese surnames are
normally single character. Their given names are one to two
19

Ibid.
Pamela Crossley, The Manchus (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). Kindle
ed Chapter 2, Loc 550.
21
Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F Siu, and Donald S Sutton, Empire at the
Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley:
University of California Press Berkeley, 2006), 27.
20
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characters. In contrast, the Manchu names are longer than the two
syllable names of Chinese. A Chinese name may look along the
lines of “Wang Fuzhi,” whereas Manchu names resembled
something more like “Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long.” In greeting, the
Chinese used their surnames as identification, paying homage to
their familial ties. Manchus, however, identified themselves not by
their familial ties but by their banner affiliation.22 For Manchus,
names were nothing more than a syllable to be recorded for later
reference. Their main concern was representing the sounds of the
Manchu language. To hold on to a true representation of the
Manchu language, names used appearance, character, and even
numbers.23 The ease of naming practices was not one enjoyed by
the Han. Han names were fraught with meaning.24 Burdened by the
belief that naming was tied directly to fate, words such as “sickly”
or “weak” would not be found in Chinese names. Names were an
important first step in a person’s life that professionals were often
consulted. For the Han, every detail in regards to the naming
process was taken into consideration, so much so that Han Chinese
of the same generation would use common names, a process which
the Manchus paid little mind to.25 There were cases where
Manchus had Chinese sounding names or Chinese had Manchu
names. Yet it was a belief that Manchus were to have Manchu
names and the Han, Chinese names.
Intangible characteristics alone did not make up the
Manchu identity. Physical appearances were also observed, such as
dress. The most notable stylistic choice for the Manchu was the
men’s hairstyle. The queue required the men to shave their
forelocks, leaving only a piece of long, braided hair at the back of
their head. However, since its introduction into the mass Chinese
public, it was no longer a clear marker for Manchu ethnicity. The
women on the other hand, maintained their own identity. Where
the Manchu men’s hairstyle became one of the masses, the
22

Elliott, 241-2.
Ibid., 242-3.
24
Ibid., 242.
25
Ibid., 243-4.
23
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Manchu women’s became one of distinction. Han women wore a
simple bun on the top of their head, leaving all décor to a variation
of headdresses. The Manchu women were the innovators of the use
of hair extensions. Worn back, the Manchu women would take
their hair and wrap it around either a wooden, metal, or ivory fillet
that fastened behind their hair, in an intricate triangle pattern.
Extending dramatically, the Manchu women would dress their hair
with flowers or other decorative pieces and earrings that helped set
the Manchu woman and Han women apart.26 At the appearance
level, the Manchu women were the examples of separation
between the two groups as by passing the Queue edict. Manchu
men had a difficult time standing out from Han or Mongol.
For the Manchu women, beauty came to reflect in the style
of their hair. For the Han women, foot binding was a mark of
beauty. This often led to the painful process of wrapping a
woman’s, sometimes young girl’s, foot until it turned into the
smaller, deformed, “beautiful” one. The Manchus did not see small
feet as a marker of beauty. “[There] were several women, natives
of Tartary or Tartar extraction, whose feet were not distorted like
those of the Chinese… The Tartar ladies have hitherto kept their
legs at liberty, and would never submit to the Chinese operation of
crippling the feet.”27 Foot binding was frowned upon by the
Manchu women, who could not see the apparent beauty that came
with the manipulation of one’s feet. Though an attempt was made
to ban foot binding, the ban was lifted in 1668 after the Han
women refused to give up the practice.28
For all for the importance of the previously discussed
identity traits, the most important part to the Manchu culture, in
terms of identity, was the banner system. The banner system was
the division of the Manchus into different groups, resembling a
class structure of. Typically, the top three banners were the upper
class. From the beginning, the eight banners’ purpose was to
provide an efficient, quick way of “mobilizing an army” that at the
26

Ibid., 250.
Ibid., 246.
28
Ibid., 247.
27
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same time transformed the Jurchen tribes into a unified Jin state,
moving away from tribal ties to a centralized power.29 Building
from hunting traditions and tactics, Nurhaci used the quasi-military
maneuvers of the hunt to practice warfare skills. He also based the
division of the Jurchen army, on the hunting experience of old.30
The division of the banners extended beyond the military.
The Manchus were divided into different groups whose boundaries
would encompass not only the other males of the household but
also their wives, children and servants.31 Typically, once the hunt
was over, one was expected to return to their different regions all
over the nation, as the units of the hunting parties were temporary.
The banner organization changed this aspect of the hunt and with
the division of the groups, the units were to remain in a designated
area with their families always ready for battle. This factor served
the Jin well in their goal of conquest. Beginning with four banner
colors, in 1615 the system evolved into the well-known Eight
banner system. Twenty years later, when the Manchus began their
invasion of China, the expansion included all ethnic groups,
including both the Mongols and the Han.32 The total number of
banners amounted to twenty-four, yet the eight Manchu banners
came to be known as the core of the banner system. The beginning
of the banner system did not allow open enrollment. Even after
Mongols and Chinese were allowed to join a banner society, it was
mostly purely Han or Mongol, there was no intermixing. Complete
integration was rare.33
Division between the two ethnic groups came from all
sides. A relatively large population, the Manchus’ numbers in
comparison to the Ming failed to compete. Many have adopted the
Confucius saying that “Only by becoming ‘Chinese’ in their
political organization had the ‘barbarians’ a chance of conquering

29

Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 58.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., 59.
33
Ibid., 73.
30
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the rule over China.”34 After the Manchus adopted the Ming
government system, it would be expected that the Manchus had
willingly become Chinese or the Chinese had fed their standards to
the Manchus. This logic fails to recognize the tools of control. The
Manchus, before the introduction of any government structure,
were a divided, tribal, and feudal system. With the goal of
conquest in mind, some form of government was required, which
led to uniting the Manchus under one political system which in
turn made the conquest over the Ming easier. Despite the fact a
new ethnic group was taking control of the country, the adoption of
the Han Chinese’s bureaucratic government allowed for the daily
functions of the government to go without interruption.
Conquest is not only made easier when political structures
match, but also when the gates are left open. The actions of the
Ming rulers provided opportunity for any looking to expand their
territory. During the end of the Ming rule, the Han faced financial
decline due to the corruption within the court. Officials would not
only exempt their own property from taxes but would also lend
money with high interest rates that would allow them to acquire
more land that would be tax exempt.35 The Ming scholar-gentry
class worked for themselves by acquiring these lands, not the
government, whose source of revenues were from the taxes
collected.36 These were the problems of the Ming government;
central power was limited and with no ability to tax the land, funds
were scarce. These were funds that could have potentially been
used to repair irrigation systems, protect the lands from flooding,
or to pay for soldiers. These signs of corrosion within the Ming
Empire moved beyond the official level. Deterioration seeped
down into the local level, and upon the recollection of Nanjing’s
transition, an eyewitness recounted that in the absence of the Ming
emperor, the palace began to be gutted by the people of Nanjing,
including the eyewitness’s family: “The good things had all been
34

Michael, 3.
Ibid., 6.
36
Ibid., 72.
35
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looted; I got only the satins.”37 Not even the emperor’s parrot was
safe. The gates were open and the conquest had begun.
When the Manchus seized their opportunity and succeeded in
their goal of defeating the Ming, conquest came in many forms. It
was more than pillaging, murdering, or battles. Conquest often
occurred in the lives of the Chinese at a quick pace.38 In the case of
Nanjing, Qing soldiers quickly replaced the original Ming soldiers.
For many, the changing of protective forces was cause for concern;
the Han’s safety was in the hands of foreign forces. Yet no change
or act of Manchu domination came as great as the hairstyle of
queue for the men. A mark of identity for the Manchu men, it soon
became a mark of submission for the Han. At first, only officials
and the military were forced to change their hair to the Manchu
style. It was soon confirmed that all males of the Ming Empire
were to wear the queue and, “anyone who didn’t conform was to
be killed.”39 For the Han, the opposition against the queue was
more than a dislike of the hairstyle or its status as a mark of
submission to the Qing, but a sign of disrespect. The shaving of
one’s hair was seen as going against the Confucian belief of filial
piety, or rather the need to honor one’s ancestors. Unfortunately
for the Han, resistance to the queue made little difference.
The conquest of the Han Chinese began to change the
relationship between the Han Chinese and the Manchus. Prior to
the complete conquest, the Manchus had been Chinese rebels in
the eyes of the Ming. When the queue was enforced, the Han
became aware that the Manchus were anything but Chinese. To
them, any modeling of the Manchu-styled haircut was inhuman,
much less Chinese.40 It was not only the Han who were quick to
assume the Manchus were below them in status. The Manchus’
low view of the Han was seen in the example of the women who
were captured in Yangzhou and were brought to Nanjing, who
37

Lynn A Struve, Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tiger’s
Jaws, Birmingham (New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1944), 60.
38
Ibid., 63.
39
Ibid., 64.
40
Ibid.
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were tethered together, and given a price.41 To the Manchus, the
Han were objects to be sold or reshaped in an image befitting what
pleased them.
The Manchus were reshaping the Han to look like them,
especially the men. At the same time, each group maintained their
separation. Separation only seemed natural to the Manchus and the
Han. According to one Chinese scholar, Wang Fuzhi, separation
existed in nature thus it existed in society. “So it is that dew,
thunder, frost, and snow all occur at their proper times, and
animals, plants, birds, and fish all keep to their own species. There
can be no frost or snow during the long summer days, nor can there
be dew or thunder in the depths of winter.”42 In his own
philosophical way, Wang commented that to mix the two groups
together would be going against nature, which was one of two key
elements to the Chinese culture as a way to maintain order and
peace.
In order to govern an empire as large as China during the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, peace was important. The
purpose of the adoption of some of the Chinese culture, such as the
political system, was to maintain peace. The hopes of the Manchus
were not to become assimilated into the Chinese culture, yet the
image had become an important part to the Manchus as they came
into power. Hoping to rid their identity of the barbarian stigma, the
Manchus had adopted the Ming bureaucratic style. The Confucian
practice of widow chastity was also adopted. By adopting such a
custom, the Manchus hoped it would work to “publicly
demonstrate to their Han Chinese subjects their benignity and
refinement,”43 not to become assimilated into the Han culture.
Widow chastity was adopted to change the image of the Manchus

41

Ibid., 65.
William Theodore De Bary, “Wang Fuzhi” Sources of Chinese Tradition:
Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century: Vol. 2 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), 28-9.
43
Mark C. Elliott, “Manchu Widows and Ethnicity in Qing China,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 34.
42
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as well as provided legitimacy to the Manchu rule.44 The Manchus
were an alien force, whose “crimes” against the Han made the
acceptance of their rule difficult. Widow chastity helped to ease
some of the tension between the two and allowed the Han to see
beyond the perceived Manchu barbarianism. Even more, widow
chastity served to show, not only the legitimacy of the Manchu
rulers, but that the Manchu women were just as deserving of grace
as the Han women.45 The Manchus made it clear that they were on
the same level, if not higher, to that of the “civilized” Han. The
adoption of Chinese cultural practices, such as widow chastity,
made the peace between the two possible. However separation still
existed.
As Rana Mitter points out, “the Mandate of Heaven theory
did not demand that China’s rulers be Chinese, only that they
accepted the conceptual framework on which the Chinese imperial
institution rested (cheng) and that they bring all the Chinese under
one unified rule (t’ung).”46 At the same time as the Manchus were
bringing all under one unified rule, they were creating barriers
between themselves and the Han. These barriers would far outlast
the end of the Qing. Even in the adoption of Chinese practices,
there was separation. In the case of widow chastity, chastity often
brought recognition and awards from the imperial court. In turn,
these awards brought substantial funds to the women and their
family. However, the division of the awards caused strife among
the two groups. The number of recipients of the awards tallied up
to a high number of Manchus. This number far exceeded that of
the Han recipients.47
The extreme practice of widow chastity in some cases
involved suicide. Suicides among these widows were a common
and well respected practice during the Ming. The Manchus saw it
44

Ibid., 38.
Ibid., 39.
46
Rana Mitter, Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration
During the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000), 18-19.
47
Elliott, 40-41.
45
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as a “lack of respect for life” and a minor reflection on their own
supposed “barbarian” nature.48 The Qing attempted to stop the
practice by arguing that it went against Confucianism, masking the
real motivation of their desire to separate themselves from the
barbarian stigma.49 Even with the disapproval of the Qing court,
the Han and the Manchu women continued the practice of
“following one into death,” a practice that existed before Chinese
use. The difference of the Manchu use of the practice was in more
cases that the wife was not the only one to accompany the man in
death. Maids, consorts, and even other males followed the
deceased man into death, as in the case of the Shunzhi emperor.50
Suicides were not a source of pride or distinction for the Manchus
as it was for the Han. Suicides were centered more on loyalty and
death.51
The acceptance of widow chastity by the banner women
extended beyond ancestral traditions or the loyalty to one’s
husband. Financial rewards also played a role. Han widows were
forced to rely on the family of the deceased husband for support.
Manchu widows, due to the 1762 edict of the Qianlong emperor,
received more assistance regardless of their age. Prior to this,
chastity was only open to those over the age of forty.52 Benefits
made it appealing for banner women to remain chaste. The benefits
may have been appealing but the issue of choice also affected
whether or not widow chastity was practiced. The Han women
were to practice chastity, willing or not. For the Manchus, at times,
chastity was never an option. To prevent the abuse of the
assistance given to them exclusively, thus creating a pressure on
the National treasury, Manchu widows were commonly forced to
48

Ibid., 44-5.
Ibid., 53.
50
Ibid., 46. The Shunzhi Emperor was the son of Hong Taiji, who succeeded
his father and became emperor at the age of six. His reign was from 1644 to
1661. Under him the queue edict was issued through his uncle, Dorgon, who
served as his regent. Rowe, 19 and 40.
51
Elliott, 47.
52
Ibid., 61.
49
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remarry. Pressures on the treasury and the population numbers
became a concern for the Manchus. Already having less than their
conquered subjects, widow chastity further lessened the
population. In light of this, Manchu widows under forty were
forced to remarry to continue the Manchu line.53
The Manchu officials, by the adoption of certain policies,
saw that: “if they publicly embraced the concept of China, such
acceptance of Han culture would win them the support of the Han
people.”54 The Manchus had conquered a nation that far
outnumbered their own. The adoption of some cultural customs,
such as chastity and the bureaucratic government, served to
appease the roaring, rebellious voices of the Han. The Manchus
understood that concession was necessary in order to maintain
peace. At the same time, they did not wish to discard their own
cultural differences to conform to become fully Han Chinese.
Anything of Han Chinese influence that was seen as unnecessary
to maintain peace was changed.55 It so happened that in the process
of creating Qing China, the Manchus got rid of most aspects of
Han China.
Among the first changes was the Ming’s geographical
redefinition of China. Ming China encompassed fifteen provinces
and the Han Chinese who resided within them. Under the Qing,
China grew to include the lands of what once was Manchuria, and
present day Mongolia, Xinjang, Tibet, along with a number of
other areas.56 The expansion of China’s borders helped stabilize its
economy and aided the newest residents of China. In stabilizing
the economy, “the Manchu emperors not only legitimated their
own rule but also opened the way for the banner armies to conquer
and incorporate a range of ethnically diverse peoples into the
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imperium.”57 For as much as the Manchus used traditions, cultural
practices, or government structures, they were not Chinese, thus
they were not treated the same way. The Manchus changed the
social hierarchy.

Image of Ming Empire.

58

“They demarcated the whole area north of Tongji Gate and
Dazhong Bridge and west of the place called Small Camp near
Gem Pearl Bridge [for exclusive occupation by Qing bannermen],
and they ordered everyone to move out of the dwellings in that
area within three days.” 59 Nanjing was only one example of Han
residents who were moved out of their homes in order to corner off
a section of cities to accommodate the Manchus. The ability to do
so exhibited the power the Manchus now had, a power envied by
the Han. “Upon seeing the Prince of Yu at West Floral Gate,
Zhang also told his circle that his own ancestors had been Tartars
and that he still had a portrait of them in Manchu costume in his
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home, so it was fitting that he shave his head.”60 Though stating
the reason for the acceptance of the Manchu hairstyle so easily was
his ancestral connection, in reality Zhang’s willingness to support
the Manchu side shows the power they had, a power and status
Zhang hoped to gain.
Zhang, as well as the other Han subjects, would soon learn
that “Manchus [were] to be an example for the Han Chinese.”
Separation between the two would lead to favoritism for one,
mistreatment for the other.61 The Manchus had adopted the Ming’s
bureaucratic government. However, banner appointments were not
subjugated to the law of avoidance as the Chinese appointed
officials were.62 Law of avoidance kept corruption within a
government at bay by making it against the rules for an official to
be posted in his home province or in a neighboring province. In the
bureaucratic system the Qing had adopted, there was still room for
change. The Manchus not only could serve within their own
banners but also benefitted from many opportunities within the
government and military. The Han, even those of the greatest
talents, were confined to certain positions within the Chinese
banners and the government.63 Even those who had joined the
Manchu side from the very beginning faced the same treatment.
The once high officials of the Ming became the lowly ones of the
Qing. “When my father was in the Ming court, was he not the
exalted Duke of Pingguo? Now that he’s serving the Qing Court,
how is it that he’s behind others? But it is that way even for those
who went over to the Qing first.”64
Favoritism had become another form of separation between
the Manchus and the Han. Those who served in the banners and as
banner soldiers were shown considerable amount of favor. Due to
the amount of hardship and the possibility of death in service, the
needs of the bannermen were met. Money was given in the form of
60
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silver, households wanted for nothing as allowances were given to
each man to cover the housing and food needs for him and his
family. Weapons, as well as supplies to care for their horses, were
also provided. Additional stipends were given to cover any
financial circumstances; bravery in battle was rewarded with a
monetary sum.65 Debts, weddings, and funerals were paid for by
the court; the banner soldiers had become known as the people
who “ate the emperor’s rice.”66 The costs of such care were taken
from the imperial treasury. The source of income for the treasury
was the taxes paid by the Han, who in the meantime were evicted
from their homes for the Manchus. Even when the Chinese banners
existed, they did not receive quite the same treatment and for sure
the regular Han citizens did not.
Becoming an official in the imperial court was even more
rewarding than being a simple bannerman. Salaries and benefits of
officers, officials of the bannermen, were regularly higher and
more favorable in comparison to the civilian officials (the Han).
The route to these official positions required a three part civil
service examination. In another cultural practice adopted by the
Manchus, the Han had the advantage as they were more familiar
with the texts that were tested upon. However even among the
Han, who spent years studying, numbers of those that passed at the
first level, let alone all three, were low. This was the problem that
presented itself to the Qing court; they had adopted the system
when they came in to power to appease the Han, but the Manchus
themselves were not scholars. Out of the 108 first-place honors,
only one was given to a bannerman, who was not even a Manchu
but a Mongol.67 For the Manchu officials, the question that arose
was how to guarantee that Manchus would pass so that they would
be able to hold posts within the imperial court? To solve this
dilemma, the Manchus set up many methods to guarantee the
acquisition of a government position was made easier for a
bannerman. One method was by “imposing a quota of successful
65
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banner candidates, so that the examination standard was, so to
speak, on a ‘curve.’”68 Not trusting one method to guarantee the
Manchus would dominate the official positions, the examination
was easier for the banner soldiers, sometimes only requiring
translations between Manchu and Chinese. The Manchus had the
highest success rate of other ethnic group, including the Han.
Again such favorable treatment was focused only on the Manchus,
not the Han.69
There was only one route to a government position for the
Han, the examination system. The Manchus were not as
unfortunate. Bannermen also had the option to work their way
through the banner hierarchy, by creating successful careers within
the military, or were awarded government positions. A bannerman
could acquire a position in the government by either creating both
a successful career and working his way through the Banner
hierarchy or by being awarded for impressive performance in
battle with a high position. Either method was accomplished
without a degree or ever taking the examination. “And when have
we ever relied on people who came up through the military
examinations? Would we place our leadership and trust in
them?”70 Other bannermen relied on family connections as did
Agui, whose father, Akdun, an important official, gave him a
position as a secretary.71 Family connections were often the
footholds to the life as an imperial official. As Evelyn Rawski
points out, “the Qianlong Emperor frequently appointed banner
nobles who were linked to him through marriage to the Grand
Council: the number of Manchus on the Grand Council exceeded
Chinese in 73 percent of the sixty years of his reign.”72 The
68
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methods opened to the Manchu bannermen were not opened to all.
The Han did not have these same options and instead had to look
for other positions.
While the bannermen dominated the government positions, the
Han attempted to hold some presence in government. Most of the
imperial positions that were held by the Han Chinese were local
level positions, such as the magistrate. The magistrates oversaw
the grievances of a number of towns. The magistrate could act as
judge and jury, except when it came to legal cases concerning the
Manchus. Any crime committed by a bannerman, even
premeditated murder, could only be handled by the magistrate to
the point of discovery. They were then required to hand the case to
local banner authorities to be dealt with.73 It did not stop there.
Torture could not be used on bannermen in interrogations, they
were held in their own prisons, and made it difficult for civilians
(the Han) to bring charges against them as they held immunity
from the regular prosecution ordinance. “[S]o there is no way to
enforce the law inside the Manchu city.”74 Even when measures
were taken to enforce the charges, the punishment was left to
garrison commanders. It was mandatory for punishments to be
lessened for all bannermen.75 Manchus were above the law and
above the Han. They kept themselves separate at all times, even
within their banner organization, separating the Chinese banners
from the Mongols. Even though they could claim to part of the
banner system, they received less than their Manchu counterparts.76
The favoritism shown to the Manchus as well as signs of
Han submission had come to resemble a form of conquest. The
conquest of the Ming had come in to form of hair, social
demographics, and ultimately separation. It also came in the form
of death and destruction. By the time the conquest was over, many
of Han descent shared the feelings of Shi Kefa, whose last diary
73
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entry read: “To repay the nation with this one death is surely my
destiny. I only regret not having earlier followed our former
emperor to the grave…In a world like this, life is of no use
anyway; one might as well come to this conclusion early on.”77
What preceded this feeling of despair was a story of mass
pillaging, rape, and murder as the city of Yangzhou fell. A survivor
of the event, Wang Xiuchu, describes a scene of chaos as “the men
guarding the wall came down, making a commotion, and scurried
for cover, throwing off their helmets and spears, some even
cracking their heads or spraining their ankles.”78 In fear of what
was to come, the city was left open, undefended, and ready for the
invaders to enter.
The soldiers fled, leaving the citizens to face the Manchus.
As stated by Wang, those left in the city attempted to welcome the
Qing troops and burned incense “to show they dared not resist.”79
Many believed that peace could be reached between the two
groups. Others, such as Wang, realized that the Manchus had not
come for just their lands. Those who realized this turned to their
wives and other female relatives to say: “Enemy soldiers have
entered the city. If things go awry, you should cut short your own
life.”80 Wang’s wife response was that of appealingly logical,
saddened mindset, “Women like me in situations like this no
longer think to live in the human world.”81 To die appeared to the
better option than to be conquered by the Manchus. Bribes of silver
or any other wealth delayed any acts against the Han but it could
not delay the evitable. “The sounds of lamentation and pain outside
struck terror from the ears to the soul.”82 To maximize the
destruction, the Qing set the city on fire and issued false promises
to spare any who did not resist. Crowds gathered in the squares
under the protection of these false promises where true terror
77

Struve, 31.
Ibid., 33, Wang Xiuchu.
79
Ibid., 34.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid., 35.
78

99

Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color

began. Women were tied together at the neck, babies were left on
the ground, where trampled victims’ organs began to blend in with
the mud, and dead bodies decorated the streets.83 The days of
killing began to number and extermination appeared to be
evident.84 The feelings of resentment began to build. “Before my
eyes I seemed to see countless souls [Buddhist] guardian demons
driving a million souls to their deaths in hell.”85 The Manchus’
goal appeared to be mass destruction as was as one soldier
revealed to Wang. “If I don’t kill you, somebody else is sure to.”86
By the end of massacre 80,000 had died by the hand of the
Manchus in Yangzhou.87
To repair the damage that events such as Yangzhou had
caused, the Manchus attempted to change their image. The
Manchus, aiming to be seen as benefactors than conquerors, started
with the survivors where the attack was the greatest, i.e. Yangzhou.
For the survivors, peace came in the form of rice and clothing.88
The Manchus hoped to portray an image of benevolence, one that
would be copied. An image they believed would only come across
up close. At the same time as the Manchus were to be an example
for the Han, they also forced them into subjugation. After the fall
of the Ming, a large number of Han had become the slaves of the
Manchus. Whether through capture or bankruptcy, the Manchus
believed that while they were slaves, the Han had benefitted. In a
1723 report, it is said that Han came “to Manchu houses, dreaming
of a place to rest their bodies and not wanting to go hungry, they
all ask to stay. In this way Manchus also take on slaves [Ma
aha].”89 By taking them on as slaves, the Manchus were helping
the Han by providing food and shelter, if they suffered in the
process, it was rarely reported. The Manchus were the great
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“providers” of the Qing Dynasty, rather than the murderers of the
Han.

Image of Yangzhou massacre.

90

The case of Yangzhou served as an example of what
Manchu rule looked like. It showed the power of the Qing, their
ideas regarding their relationship with the Han. There is a question
of whether the mistreatment of the Chinese was more extreme than
other ethnic groups. The cities that were attacked were not of
Mongol, or other, ethnicity; the cities were Chinese. At the
mention of the treatment of the women during this period, one
soldier made mention that when they had conquered Korea (1627,
1636-7) they “had captured women by the tens of thousands, and
not one lost her chastity.”91 The repeated mentioning of rape that
occurs reveals that the Han women were not treated the same as
Korean women. The conquest of the Ming empire both helped
define who the Manchus were and united them as an ethnic group.
At the same time, the acts of subjugation, violence, favoritism, and
separation ultimately established the tense relationship between the
Manchus and the Han. A relationship that would not change for the
next 276 years, leading to several of China’s key historic events.
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Change in Power: 1911
In the late nineteenth century, several decades after the Taiping
Rebellion, the Guangxi Emperor saw the warning signs of a larger
movement and took action. In 1898, the Guangxi emperor, the lone
representative of the Manchu side, was joined by many Han
Chinese reformers. Though many called for the end of Manchu
design, which would change the social structure, or even the
elimination of the queue, many believed it was not taking the
reform movement far enough.92 The goal of the One Hundred Days
of Reform was to eliminate the differences between the Manchus
and the Han. To do so, one reformer, Zhang Yuanji, listed six
reforms that would end the differences in the relations between the
Han and the Manchus. These six would bring an end to
administrative separation, social and occupational segregation by
getting rid of the separate slots for Manchus and Han, and allow
intermarriage. Zhang also hoped to end the stipends meant for
banner soldiers and create schools that would work to give
vocational training to unemployed bannermen. The banner system
had made it impossible for its members to look outside of the
military or government for work. Now, even the emperor called for
the bannermen to move beyond the system.93
The target of the reforms was the Manchu way of life.
However, for Liang Qichao, disciple of Kang Youwei, this was not
the goal.94 Liang Qichao believed there was a need for the races to
merge together, “only because they had mixed together were they
able to survive. Meanwhile, numerous other groups had perished
because they had not intermixed.”95 China was facing increasing
competition from the Western powers, that they could not win
divided. Essentially, Liang believed that the superior race, the Han,
92
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had a chance at survival. The Manchus, inferior, ran the risk of
dying out if they did not choose to intermix.
If their oppressive policies continue much longer,
they will engender a great upheaval, in which
resolute scholars all over the country will either
declare independence, as in America, or start a
revolution, as in France and Spain. By then, of
course, it will be too late for the Manchus to regret.
Or if it does not happen like this, then after a few
more years of today’s reactionary government, there
will be partition. As partition takes place, the secret
societies will rise and run amok. Since the
government’s authority cannot penetrate to the local
level, the people will have free rein to take their
revenge. Whatever else might happen, the Manchus
in the provincial garrisons will surely be
annihilated. After partition both Han and Manchus
will be enslaved. But the Han, because they have a
large population and are not lacking in intelligence,
will still be able to conspire to join together to
regain their independence. The Manchus, on the
other hand, are not only few in number but also
stupid and weak. Although they will have escaped
the vengeance of the Han, they will forever serve as
beasts of burden for the white people. Moreover,
Han farmers and artisans are industrious and
frugal…. Consequently, even if the Han territory is
partitioned, the Han people will still have some
influence in the world; though subjugated, they will
survive in the end. The Manchus [on the other hand]
have for the past two centuries eaten without
farming and been clothed without weaving. Not one
among their five million people is capable of being
a scholar, farmer, artisan, or merchant. When
partition occurs and their political, financial, and
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military powers have all fallen into the hands of the
white race, if they want some food or lodging then,
will they still get it? Therefore, what the Manchus
themselves have decided to do is precisely a selfchosen road to destruction. This truly is an example
of “quenching one’s thirst by drinking poisoned
wine.96
Liang sees the Manchus as parasites who would not survive if
forced to do so on their own. Resentment over current policies and
past attacks remained just as strong at this point as it did then.
Should the Manchus wish to prevent any Han uprising, intermixing
was the only solution according to Liang.
For others intermixing was not a solution, as there had
never been any separation to begin with. A student of Charles
Darwin, Yan Fu advocated the belief that today’s world features
many different species. However all of these species came from
one source. 97 Where Liang pits the Manchus and the Han Chinese
as two opposing races, Yan Fu sees them not as competitors but
belonging to the same race, the yellow race. Yan Fu claims that the
rule of China has never been by an outside force. It is only now
that the rule of China is threatened by another outside, race, the
Westerners.98
Separation or not, either thought did not stop the reforms of
the 1898 Reform Movement from coming about with great speed.
As stated earlier, the reforms attacked the Manchus’ way of life yet
they were supported by the Guangxi Emperor. The emperor was
the only Manchu to agree with the reforms. Liang was correct in
assuming that the banner people had no way to support themselves
outside of the stipends they received. The “preferential treatment”
such as leniency in legal occurrences or favorable government
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posts would cease, thus ending the Manchus’ way of life for the
past two hundred years.99
As quick as it started, the Hundred Days of Reform was
brought to an end as the Empress Dowager Cixi placed the
Guangxi emperor under house arrest. As many of the reformers
fled from fear of punishment, many of the reforms set forth were
discarded.100 The Barriers were reinstated and life returned to the
way as it was. The issue of reform was not revisited until the Boxer
Rebellion. Imperialism and industrialization during the late
nineteenth century had pushed Western nations farther into other
nations, spreading new ideas and increasing pressure on the Qing.
One of these ideas, Social Darwinism, was the pitting of the “white
race against the yellow.”101 With the failures of the Opium Wars,
the Sino-Japanese Wars, and other disputes between China and
foreign nations, many realized that China lacked the ability to
compete with outside forces. “The arrival of Western merchants,
industries, railways, gunboats and ideas upset and changed the
usual course of events…The security and permanence of the
Chinese system under whatever rule came to an end.”102 The
foreign nations, who had become a greater presence in China by
the 1900’s, would lead to its future problems.
The instigators to these problems were the Boxers. The
Boxers, ancestors to China’s Nationalist Party of 1911, were
strictly anti foreign. Foreign competition had left the cotton
production in Shandong in a state of poverty. The residents also
faced flooding in the Yellow River, financial decline, drought, plus
numerous invasions by foreign groups. Out of Shandong, the
Boxers began their attacks against foreigners. What started as a
fraction of a small group would help lead to the demise of Qing
Rule and Cixi in particular. Cixi’s court issued commands to
tolerate, not suppress, the Boxers and soon joined the anti-foreign
movement. Any within the Qing court who opposed were
99
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executed. The national court did little to stop the Boxer violence
and forced the involvement of foreign nations. The Qing lost and
heavy reparations were issued, which the treasury had no way to
pay. In light of this, foreign nations, such as England and France,
took control over much of the revenue producing areas of the
government, such as the salt administration, until the debt was
paid. The power and safety the Manchus had known no longer
existed.103 Whatever power remained would only be preserved
through reform.
The motivations behind the reforms that came about after
the Boxer Rebellion were different than those of the reform of
1898. During the reign of Guangxi, there was a desire to reshape
China to create a united nation through the blending of the two
cultures. During the reign of Cixi, and that of Pu’yi, reform was for
the sake of control. The January 29, 1901 Reform Edict stated that
“the whole system of government must be radically transformed so
that wealth and power might eventually be attained.”104 The
Dowager Empress had ended the reforms of 1898 with a coup and
executions. What had changed was that Cixi had invested in the
wrong side during the Boxer Rebellion and lost. In an act of selfpreservation, Cixi gave into the reforms.
Among the first reforms that the edict called for was the
blending of both Chinese and foreign policies, to “suppress
vigorously the use of the terms, ‘new’ and ‘old’, and to blend
together the best of what is Chinese and what is foreign.”105 The
policies of old that had been harmful to China included the ones
concerning the Manchus. The banner system and the imperial
court, which had closed the ranks to any non-Manchu groups,
began to open its doors. Even with the end of the separation, the
Manchus believed the barriers had existed for a reason. In the case
of intermarriage, Cixi stated the rarity of intermarriage was due to
unfamiliarity with each other’s culture, customs, and language.106
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After several hundred years of social separation, one would think
that the unfamiliarity between the two would have grown. Even if
it did, the desire to maintain control over the empire took
precedence over the desire for separation.
The forced end of separation between the Han and the
Manchu did not only focus on social aspects but moved on to the
political theatre. December 29, 1903 marked the end of Manchu
monopoly on posts in the banner system and the ban barring all
non-Manchu entry into Manchuria. In the process of reforming
China, Cixi reshaped the social and political demography by taking
several steps to move the government from a monarchy to a
constitutional monarchy, giving the people more power. Set to be
implemented over a number of years, this was to be Cixi’s last
attempt to maintain control over China. However for all the
changes and reforms that were implemented, the circumstances in
China did not improve. Outside voices praised the reforms that
worked to end the “distinctions between Manchus and Chinese,”
but also cautiously watched over the new Chinese parliament. 107
With the Qing working to end the distinction between the
Han and the Manchus, the late nineteenth to early twentieth
century Manchus no longer resembled their ancestors who had
conquered the Ming in the 1640’s. Some key ethnic traits, such as
the banner system, began to show signs of decay as early as the
Taiping Rebellion. Archery, once an often practiced skill, now
began to be seen as a novelty as guns became the weapon of
choice. Yet to say that the Manchus had acculturated into the
Chinese culture would be dismissing the other traits that did
survive, such as the Manchu language. The Yongzheng emperor
was correct when he stated: “If some special encouragement as this
is not offered, the ancestral language will not be passed on and
learned.”108 In the beginning of the Manchu conquest, schools
were created with the purpose of teaching and preserving the
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Manchu language. However, by the Revolution of 1911, Chinese
had become the main script, with little as one percent in cities
being able to read Manchu, even less were able to speak it.109
Chinese may have been the main language used in the cities, but
the usage of Manchu increased as one ventured farther out, even in
Manchuria. In the Imperial Court, documents were recorded in
Chinese and Manchu.110 Banner schools also continued in its
instruction of Manchu. The Manchu language, though limited in its
use, remained a distinctive identity trait for the Manchus.
Naming practices were also preserved by the Manchus.
Over the course of Han and Manchu interaction, Manchu names
began to reflect more Han monosyllabic style names. Manchu
personal names (first names) became shortened to disyllabic and
meaning was also taken into consideration.111 The first names had
changed but the family names (last names) were not. When certain
Manchus, who were in no way attached to the imperial clan,
changed their polysyllabic surnames to the monosyllabic style of
the Han, the Qing officials were displeased. The changing of the
personal names held no importance to the Qing, however to change
their surnames would come to mean they had “forgotten their
roots.”112 The surname was the connection to their past. At the
same time as the surname was being preserved, the Manchu
identification was also maintained. In the beginning, Manchus
identified themselves by their banner affiliation rather than their
familial lineage, as the Han did. Still true, the Manchus preferred
to use other choices in place of their surname, in this case their
personal names. Though small, seemingly unimportant ethnic
traits, these traits still presented an image of who the Manchus
were, as well as maintaining their separation from the Chinese
culture.
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At this point it became evident that the Manchus had not
sinicized into the Chinese Culture, as stated by Zhang Binglin:
Today, have the Manchus assimilated to the Han
people? Or have they conquered the Han people?
Manchu shamanism is not the orthodox imperial
religion, queues and jeweled necklaces are not the
Chinese caps; and the documents of the Qing in its
own language are not traditional Chinese
orthodox… Their talk of the ‘same race’ is not to
turn the Manchus into Han people, but to make the
Han people Manchus!
The Han may have grown accustomed to the lifestyle of the
Manchu and had grown accustomed to the queue, but for the Han,
it was not their natural lifestyle.113 Nor did they agree with the
favorable treatment shown only to the Manchus. General Zeng and
General Zou had been the heroes of the Taiping Rebellion. The
Generals were also Han Chinese. They were given the titles but
commanded local forts with no real power. On the other hand, a
Manchu governor who suppressed an uprising in Taiwan, less
significant, was made a “Beile Commandery Prince.”114
Cixi and the imperial court had taken measures to unite the
Manchus and Han under one culture. Upon her death, these
reforms were then entrusted to the three-year-old emperor, Pu’yi,
and his father Zaifeng, who served as Pu’yi’s regent.115 The first
steps in Cixi’s plan to reform the Manchu/Han relations
encompassed reforms such as reorganizing the banner system,
eliminating the banner stipends, and dissolving the eight banner
system to end all differences between the Manchus and Han.116 But
the retaining of such traits as names and language, made it clear
113
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that, despite their best efforts, the barriers would not come down.
The ones holding onto these barriers were the Manchus. All
Manchu men had been restricted on where they could seek
occupations, either within the banner system or state
bureaucracy.117 When jobs proved to be difficult to find, the
stipends became the supplement to their livelihoods. The increased
burden and pressure on the government to reform occurred when
the Manchus began to live above their means. The reforms of the
1900’s, threatened to take away their only source of income, their
lifestyle, and thrust them into jobs they were not equipped to
handle. As soon as it became clear this was to be their future, the
bannermen pressured Zaifeng, who eventually succumbed to their
demands.118
Any attempt by Zaifeng to consolidate control through the
means of reform, failed. The bannermen feared any change that
would remove their social status, such as a change in the mourning
period. Han tradition calls for the mourning period to last twentyseven months. Due to the length of time, Han officials were forced
to resign from their posts, which were then given away. The
Manchus were not faced with this problem. The Manchu mourning
period lasted only a hundred days, a time that did not force them to
resign from their posts. Upon the movement to end ethnic
differences, the Ministry of Rites mandated that the Han mourning
period would be observed by both sides in order to create equality.
Instead Zaifeng, upon the request by the Manchus, left a loophole
which made it possible for officials to remain in their positions
during the mourning period, so long as they petitioned to do so.
Han officials rarely petitioned to remain in their positions. The
largest number of officials who used this loophole was the Manchu
officials.119 Zaifeng also attempted to reinstate a small fracture of
the power the Qing once held by making the emperor the direct
commander over the military.120 While Zaifeng had hoped for the
117
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revival of the Manchus as the dominating ethnic group, revolution
forced him to eliminate all differences, including Manchu
women’s dress, opening Manchu cities, etc. Yet all of this did little
to diffuse the spread of revolution.121
Many doubted the effectiveness of these reforms. “It is
predicted that unless the Manchus immediately demonstrate the
sincerity of the imperial edicts being issued at Peking the slaughter
will exceed that of the Taiping rebellion.”122 Zaifeng had his fiveyear-old son, Pu’yi, issue an edict taking the blame for appointing
too many officials that were imperial relatives and also enacted the
reforms of the Guangxi emperor.123 All were done to preserve the
power and control of the Manchus and the Qing Court. However
this edict and any that followed were seen as an act. “All today’s
edicts, like that of yesterday, are written in the first person, as
coming from the infant emperor himself. This is unusual and
apparently a device adopted by the throne’s advisers in a pathetic
attempt to create among the people a feeling of personal loyalty for
their sovereign.”124
This tool did not work. Further complicating the problems
arising was the poor financial state China was in. Upon the
conquest of the Ming, the financial state was also in decline, due to
the decadence of the court. Just over two hundred years later and
the banner people faced the same problem as they lived above their
means, placing a burden on the government. Decadence was still a
weakness of the court as descriptions of Cixi’s funeral portray
scenes of splendor as her body is wrapped with pearls, gold, gems,
things the treasury could not afford. 125 The overspending of the
court, along with the pressures incurred upon the Han became too
great and the revolutionists issued a proclamation to the people that
stated: “In order to establish a reign of liberty, equality and
121
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fraternity the Manchus must be driven out at once; the people must
unite together to form a new government.” 126 The Qing Dynasty
was at an end.
The Revolutionaries had many reasons to justify their
attack on the millennium old monarchial system and the Manchus.
Among those justifications was a seven point argument taken from
the 1898 Affair, first being the Manchus was an alien group. Social
Darwinism had developed the idea that the five races had
subgroups that continuously had divided down. The “yellow race”
included the Chinese and Siberian as its subgroups. From the
Chinese came the Han, Korean, and Japanese. The Manchus were
thought to have come from the Siberian subgroup.127 According to
this ideology, the Manchus held no link to the Chinese, therefore
they held no right to the throne. “China belongs to the Chinese” as
one reformer, Zhang Ji, stated.128 If their lack of Chinese ties did
not prove their illegitimacy as rulers, their crimes against the Han
Chinese in 1644 did. The words of Wang Xiuchu, survivor of the
Yangzhou massacre, became a lesson for the revolutionaries: “All I
intend is that people of later generations who are fortunate to live
in a peaceful world and to enjoy uneventful times, but who neglect
self-cultivation and reflection and are inveterately profligate, will
read this and be chastened.” 129 The acts of cruelty and murders of
the 1644 conquest had made the Manchus a long lasting enemy of
the Han.
The points against the Manchus varied in gravity from
mass murders to the implementation of their own culture upon the
Han Chinese. By forcing their culture upon the Han Chinese, the
Manchus had “barbarized China.”130 The culture of the Ming, a
culture of scholars, was no more. The Manchus had adopted
Confucianism and the civil examination system into their own
culture, but rejected the core beliefs, and by having the Han shave
126
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their forelocks in submission, they disregarded filial piety. Not
only that but a culture based on the importance of meritocracy
witnessed a minority group place itself over the majority.131
Privileges, key government positions, and promotions were given
to Manchus, whereas the Han were pushed out. Divisions
throughout the empire had become the standard way of life.
“Although it has been over two hundred years, the Manchus stick
with the Manchus and the Han stick with the Han; they have not
mingled. Clearly there is a feeling that a lower race does not rank
with a noble one.”132 Neither was on the level of the other, so
relations between the two never occurred.
By stating the reasons as to why the Manchus were the
illegitimate rulers of China, it created an opportunity for the Han to
examine their identity as a nation. Many scholars of this period,
including Zhou Rong, made the claim that to have the legitimacy
to rule over China, one had to be a descendant of the Yellow
Emperor, the very first ruler of the first dynastic cycle.133 Han were
said to be these descendants, establishing theirs as the only legal
ethnicity of China.134
The seven points to discredit the Manchus, plus the idea of
a need to separate themselves from the Manchus all marked the
true unifying tool for the Han, Anti-Manchuism.135
How could we have allowed the unworthy tribes of
Mongolia and Manchuria, who knew nothing of
China or Confucianism, to steal China by means of
their barbarism and brutality! After stealing China,
they controlled the Chinese by means of the system
they had stolen, and they shamelessly made use of
Confucianism, with which they had been
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unfamiliar, to oppress China, to which they had
been strangers.136
A fault of the Manchus, according to Tan Sitong, a former pupil of
Kang, was that they knew nothing about the political system or
Confucianism before their conquest of China. This did not stop the
Manchus from using these cultures to keep people ignorant and
under the Manchu’s control. In the end, the Han’s own culture had
played a part in their conquest and their subjugation. “Today five
million Manchus rule over more than four hundred million Han
only because rotten traditions make the Han stupid and ignorant. If
the Han people should one day wake up, then the Manchus would
be totally unable to rest peacefully.”137 On October 10, 1911, the
Han did wake up and so did their resentments for the Manchus.
On the surface, the revolution was a chance for China to
join the modern political systems of the world. Below the surface,
the revolution gave the Han a chance to act upon their anti-Manchu
sentiments. In Wuchang, where the Revolution began, the Taiping
Rebellion had left a large concentration of Manchus. At the
outbreak of the Revolution, as they headed for the arsenal, one
revolutionary cried: “Slay the Manchu officials and the banner
people.” Despite the lack of resistance, many Manchus were
slaughtered. The Hubei Military government’s goals were to
“elevate the Han and exterminate the Manchus.”138 Students were
convinced to join the cause of revolution through the argument of
filial piety. The nationalists claimed it was their duty to avenge
their ancestors who had suffered at the hands of the Qing.139 The
elimination of the Manchus began with the taking down of the
imperial flag over the imperial customs office and ended with the
extermination of the Manchus. “Brutal treatment of Chinese by
Manchus has created bad impression, and slaughter that will
136
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exceed that of the Taiping revolution is predicted.”140 Manchu
cities became drenched with the color of red. Those who managed
to escape the bloodshed in the Manchu cities were no safer as they
were killed upon entering Chinese cities. Tales of mass terror came
forward as Chinese military leaders told the soldiers to spare any
except the Manchus. “One banner woman, about to be killed,
piteously cried, ‘We are guiltless; we detest our ancestors for their
mistreatment of the Han people.’ Another old woman pleaded,
‘What is to be gained by murdering us worthless women and
children? Why not release us as a show of your magnanimity?’
The soldiers, though moved, dared not reply but killed them
anyway.” 141 No help came for the Manchus as foreign nations’
concern turned to pulling out their missionaries instead of listening
to the cries of Yuan Shikai.142
Violence reigned throughout the Qing Empire. Manchus
also participated in the killings as Han Chinese were no safer than
the Manchus. The violence during this period not only showed the
resentment between the two, but also how the barriers, though
officially removed, still existed. The Manchus
were known by their clothing, by their cast of
countenance, by their speech. Their fondness for
reds and yellows, their use of white linings, their
high collars and narrow sleeves . . . their belts, their
shoes; all gave them away. With the women the
unbound feet were the fatal distinction. Their
peculiar headdress, their clothing they might
change, but there was no disguising their naturalsized feet.143
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The Manchus had changed since 1644, but not enough that they
were unable to be signaled out by “their speech.”144 The Manchus’
separate identity had been part of their downfall.
As the Qing Dynasty and the Manchus fell, the Republic of
China rose to power along with a new sense of Chinese identity.
China underwent a severe transformation, as any remnants of the
Manchu rule were removed. As Sha Tauk Kok related: “the
Revolution has succeeded and my elder brother has cut his
queue… The Manchus have starved to death, their intestines
shriveled to nothing… Do not fear the Manchus will use their
sharp knives.”145 As the Han cut their queues, they were cutting
away all signs of Manchu submission. The queues had reverted
back to being an identity marker for the Manchu males. The
Chinese looked to rid China of all remnants of the Manchus’ past
involvement. Part of this involved the political structure.
The political change that China underwent was larger than
the transition between a millennium old monarchial system to a
republic. Upon the defeat of the Qing, the demands given to the
Qing side included that the capital no longer be in Peking, which
Yuan Shikai could not serve at the provincial level until the
republic was recognized outside of China, and more importantly,
that Manchus would not be allowed to serve at the provincial
level.146 For as long as the Manchus restricted the participation of
the Han in the government, after the revolution they faced the same
treatment. The Han Chinese sought to eliminate any credence the
Qing had gained during their time in power. “Old myths assumed
new significance in the political context of the late Qing. They now
spoke not merely to flexible ways of distinguishing ‘us’ from
‘them’ through ethnicity and culture but also to the early growth of
a specific ‘Chinese’ nation that –by implication-grew like the tree
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from the seed into today’s Chinese nation.”147 Meaning that the
Han stated that the beginning of the Chinese nation began with
them, not the Manchus. As part of the process of establishing their
own identity as the “Han People,” the revolutionaries dated the
calendar to begin with the Yellow Emperor. The revolutionaries, in
the process of creating their identity, took away the right of the
Qing to set the calendar. To them, the entire period of the Qing
Dynasty was an illegitimate period.
The U.S. as well as other nations credited the new Chinese
government, seeing the Chinese as “a patient people, peace-loving,
law-abiding and with a fine respect for law. They are easily ruled if
fairly ruled, but stroke them the wrong way and it is just the
opposite.”148 Both a complement to the Han and an insult to the
Manchus, this article that appeared in The Sun in February 1912,
supported the new Chinese government due to the closed
door/anti-foreign policy the Manchus had adopted during the last
years of the dynasty. The article credits the Boxer Rebellion for
opening China to Western ideas. The Manchu rule was over, the
Han people had taken over, and China belonged the Chinese.
The only issue remaining was Manchuria. The Sun article
states that if China had succeeded in strengthening its forces and
had acquired a stable government, Japan and Russia would have no
choice but to relinquish their claim to Manchuria and Mongolia.
Then again, if China failed to put forth an image of strength, or
was “sick at that time,” outside forces would take over.149
Manchuria would become available to any strong nation, except to
those who can claim ancestral ties to it, the Manchus. Enter Japan,
China, and a desperate ethnic group.
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Manchuria Turned Manchukuo: The 1930’s
Nearly twenty years after the fall of the Qing, the issue of
sovereignty over Manchuria was still a problem. The Manchu
emperor, Pu’yi, remained a resident in the Forbidden City in
Peking, kept his title as emperor, and received an annual income of
four million dollars.150 Because he still claimed the title of
emperor, false hope was given to Pu’yi and all other Manchus that
the resurrection of another Manchu dominated dynasty was
possible. As the years passed, this false hope began to dwindle.
After a failed attempt at a restoration in 1917, the emperor and his
court were confined to their living quarters at the imperial palace
in the Forbidden City. Whether or not by choice, Pu’yi had not left
his area of the palace, not far from the throne. In a New York
article written ten years after the revolution, author Nathaniel
Peffer describes the scene “Of the once hallowed Forbidden City a
large part is now trod by profane feet.”151 Once walked by tribute
bearers who wore the finest jewels, the Forbidden City now acted
as a public park where tea, cakes, even American sandwiches and
beers are enjoyed.152 The Qing splendor had left Peking, as had
their claim to Manchuria.
With this in mind, awareness shifted to a question of who
would take over first. Japan had long been a residential power in
Manchuria, since Russia had signed over all rights of the South
Manchurian Railway to Japan at the conclusion of the RussoJapanese War in 1905. In the same treaty, the Treaty of
Portsmouth, Japan gained complete control of Korea.153 Logically,
Manchuria was next on territory acquisition list. Japan supported
the warlord of the region Zhang Zuolin in the hopes of having a
150
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hand in the running of the country. When Zhang’s goals ventured
away from the ideals of Japan, he was assassinated.154 Zhang
Xueliang’s, Zhang’s son, support of Nationalism led to the
intervention of the Japanese. This began the 1931 conflict with
China for Manchuria.
It is believed that the conflict was ignited by an attack on
the railway. The attack was staged to give Japan reason to counter
attack on the Chinese, claiming self-defense.155 China had long
held anti-Japanese sentiment, taking every opportunity to exhibit
their feelings, one being their refusal to lease Manchuria to
Japan.156 To China, Manchuria was a piece of their territory
(disregarding that its acquisition had more to do with their Manchu
rulers). Japan’s move towards Manchuria reignited ill feelings,
with commands such as “Kill Japanese on sight” being the first and
only command given.157 Japan, on the other hand, claimed that
they “do not want conquest there anymore than in China... Japan’s
position there, as is well known, is strategical and political as well
as economic.”158 Japan was a small island, whose own land was
running out with the expansion of its population. Manchuria had
miles of land unsettled, with bountiful resources. It seemed that for
all purposes, Manchuria was to become a resource base for Japan,
not part of its territory. Japan’s goal was to “foster friendly
relations between Japan and China.”159 If China didn’t believe
them, they had no problem stating “It may be superfluous to repeat
that the Japanese government harbours no territorial designs in
Manchuria.”160 Rather, Japan looked to create a new government
154
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and the campaign against the Chinese would act as a way to “clear
North Manchuria of what remained of the old military power, this
removing an obstacle that had stood on the way of bringing the
new state into being, materially clearing the atmosphere for the
outlook of the future.”161 Japan won the war with China and
Manchukuo was named an independent state in 1932.
Once the battle was done, Japan had no reason to remain in
Manchukuo. However “evidence” presented itself to the Japanese
government that said otherwise. Seeing as the “Manchurian
government at present is not strong enough to suppress them,” it
was only natural that the Kwantung army took over to guarantee
the safety and success of Manchukuo.162 The Manchus in power
slowly faded into the background as Japan worked in Manchukuo
to remold it. As its presence in Manchukuo, Japan’s actual purpose
for freeing Manchukuo from China was revealed. Instead of its
growth as an independent nation, Manchukuo was part of the
evolution of the Japanese imperialism, one to rival the Western
powers. Their goals represented their commitment to that dream.
Japan, once a colonial prize for other nations, proved its own
abilities at becoming a rival to Western powers. With its victories
against China in 1894-5 and then again against a western power,
with Russia in 1904-5, Japan proved its strengths.163 The first step
was Korea. By acquiring Korea, Japan had acquired a “guest seat”
at the imperial table, taking itself off the market as an area to
conquer by the Western Powers.164 If Korea was to serve as a way
to secure Japan, Manchuria was to secure Korea. In 1905,
Manchuria became the buffer zone between the Japanese and the
Chinese and any other western powers as Russia signed over any
rights, interests, or influence it had acquired during the nineteenth
century. Japan had already integrated itself into the elite of
Manchuria; it wasn’t long before they took complete control.165
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The real power holders in Manchukuo were the capitalists
and the military. Manchukuo served Japan in its attempt at
imperialism, at the same time renovating “[Kaizo] Japan.”166 “The
Manchurian paradise depicted by Manchukuo government planners
was intended to become the model of state capitalism, with
industrialization proceeding in steps according to a well-ordered
plan.”167 Manchuria was said to be enough to satisfy everyone.
However its main purpose was to satisfy one group, the Japanese
army, the Kwantung Army, who saw Manchuria as a resource
base.168 The emperor of Japan had no more say in the matter of
Manchukuo than Pu’yi or the other non-Japanese residents. Japan
transformed Manchukuo, the banner soldiers were replaced by the
Kwantung Army as the main fighting force, and the governments
allowed for risky investments by the banks. All of these factors
were signs that the military had taken control of the government.169
Japan remained in control of Manchukuo until the end of
World War II. It’s only goal for Manchuria was to fortify its place
among the imperial powers of the world. Aligning with Pu’yi had
been for the purpose of using his alliance with the Mongols and to
serve as a buffer zone as the Manchus were on the border and
Japan was under constant threat from Russia and China.170 “Japan
has brought this situation to pass as a means of securing essential
raw materials and food products for her own people and a market
for her manufactured goods.”171
Some would state that the 1895 Sino-Japanese War had
been warning enough for the Manchus at the motives of the
Japanese. However it made no difference to the Manchus and
Pu’yi. During the Qing Dynasty, the Manchus had been the ones in
power, the leading ethnicity. To be allied with the Manchus meant
to hold a title of prominence. The Manchu banners were awarded
166
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stipends to cover all of their costs, extra for courage in battle, but
they did not face the same grueling civil service examination that
the Han did and official posts were easier to come by. By 1911 the
Chinese declared that the Manchus would no longer be eligible to
hold positions at the provincial level.172 Pu’yi may have bared the
title of emperor, but it was a title with little power, as his salary
was now dictated by the Republic and decreasing from the initial
millions to 500,000.173 Pu’yi was faced with the reality of his
actual power in China during his flight from Peking, where he was
addressed as “Mr. Pu’yi.”174 Nor was it more obvious that the
revival of the Qing in China was unlikely to happen as once it was
made by a declaration in the Washington Times that “it was
decreed that the Manchus should never again hold power.”175
Power was not the only motivating factor for Pu’yi’s
decision to side with the Japanese. As commented upon
continuously, resentment between the Han and Manchus persisted
throughout the Qing Dynasty. It also persisted long after. On
November 5 1924, Warlord General Feng Yu-hsiang invaded
Peking. The General’s attitude was one that fell along the same
sentiments of 1911, sentiments that had led to the extermination of
Manchus. The Manchus in Peking feared that the General’s antiManchu beliefs would lead to a massacre and Pu’yi and his court
finally vacated the old capital of the Qing Dynasty. However, no
act showed the resentment shared between the two more than the
final act that pushed Pu’yi to seek aid from China’s enemy, Japan.
In 1928, one Chinese group, in an act of Cultural Revolution,
desecrated the tombs of the Qianlong Emperor and the Empress
Dowager Cixi. Jewels were stolen, statues smashed, and the bones
of the dead were scattered. While the republic celebrated the action
as “heavenly justice,” it angered Pu’yi. “My heart smouldered with
172
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a hatred I had never known before… Standing before the dark and
gloomy funerary hall I made an oath before my weeping clansmen:
‘If I do not avenge this wrong I am not an Aisin-Gioro.’ i.e. a
faithful member of the imperial Manchu clan.”176 Pu’yi sought
every opportunity for the revival of the Manchus and revenge
against the Chinese. His advisors warned him against the division
between the military and the citizens of Japan, foreseeing the
power the military would hold. However Pu’yi leapt at the chance,
with no regards to the repercussions.177
There were many reasons for Pu’yi’s decision. Among the
reasons, personal revenge remained among the strongest motives.
Pu’yi looked for revenge against the Republic for the crimes
against the Manchus and the revival of the Qing. Second,
Manchuria had been the homeland to the Manchus. Closed off to
foreign occupants until the early twentieth century, to the
Manchus, Manchuria was a sacred site. However, by this point, it
was not only the Manchus who had made Manchuria their home.
The Japanese made it clear of their goal to help the “Manchurian
people win their freedom from Chinese rule.’ There was an
element of disingenuity in the exchange which both accepted
Manchuria consisted largely of Chinese; why would Chinese free
themselves from Chinese?”178 Pu’yi’s personal goals were not
those of the remaining Manchurian residents. Open to the public,
Manchuria’s demographic had drastically changed. Manchu once
again was the minority. The only difference this time is the
majority agreed with the minority. Manchuria had disagreed with
the Republic from the beginning, choosing to remain loyal to the
emperor.
Loyalty alone did not motivate the residents of Manchuria
to fight against China. The current residents, including Manchus,
Mongols, and Japanese, had been left in the hands of warlord
Zhang Zuolin. With the goal to establish himself as the ruler of
China, Zhang started a military effort to achieve this goal, an effort
176
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that required funds. “Civilian elites in the region were unhappy at
the way in which Zhang raised taxes and overrode their newly
constituted assemblies, and even some of his military subordinates,
notably Guo Songling in 1925, attempted to overthrow him.”179
Even after his assassination in 1928 and the takeover of his son
Zhang Xueliang, Manchuria’s current situation failed to improve.
His alienation of the locals and the military, through the means of
abolishing both the provincial governments and military, led the
way to the acceptance of the Japanese in 1931.180 In turn, it forced
Zhang to turn to Nanjing for support against the Japanese backed
opposition.181 This proved to be a poor decision for Zhang, as the
Nationalists Chinese government held no favor in the eyes of the
Manchus. During the 1911 Revolution, the Manchus were seen as
a foreign force and targeted. Zhang Xueliang and his associates’
decision to not only support the nationalist movement, but to allow
its legalization within Manchuria and for some to become
members had meant that they were inviting the Manchus’ enemy
into their house.182 Resentment for the Manchus and their crimes
during the 1644 conquest had been held onto for nearly three
hundred years; there is no doubt that the Manchus could do the
same.
Aside from questionable alliances, the financial state of
Manchuria was in decline. Though promising the installation of
industry and commerce and emphasis on education, Zhang
Xueliang’s spending resembled that of his father, who had created
the financial burden in the first place. Had it not been for the
money spent on the military, as noted by the Japanese upon their
intervention, “the finance of the Three Eastern Provinces would
show a good surplus.”183 Japan appeared to be no different from
China, whose goal of “reclaiming” Manchuria was proclaimed
with every maneuver. However, Japan proceeded with caution. Its
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already conquered territories in Korea and Taiwan were colonized
but this was not the route that could be taken with Manchuria.
Instead, the independent state of Manchukuo was formed.184 The
formation of the South Manchurian Railway and immigration had
been Japan’s beginning as a presence in Manchuria.
There was no greater show of Japanese control in
Manchuria than in their involvement in the economy in Manchuria.
With plans of a centralized dictatorship, the Kwantung Army was
in charge of all future Manchurian expansion in the interests of
Japan. Part of their plans involved creating a planned economy,
with the army playing the role of the creators. An attempt to reign
in the growing debt, the Kwantung Army stated, “In view of the
evils of an uncontrolled capitalist economy, we will use whatever
state power is necessary to control that economy.”185 For some,
this was a saving act against a high debt. Yet many opposed to a
government economy. It meant losing control of all decisions, of
all businesses, such as the Railways. For many, Manchuria
presented an opportunity of freer politics than in the surrounding
nations. However many of the policies made came from a Japanese
perspective as that was the dominating group in power.186
Acceptance of the local government had given the Japanese
an advantage in their taking of Manchuria. Their increased
involvement in the economy, plus their planned attempt to expunge
the Manchurian economy of its debt, also aided in the conquest of
Manchuria by the Japanese. While the national level was
reconstructed to rid the policies of Zhang, it appeared that
Manchuria, now Manchukuo, was formed without bloodshed. Yet
the supposedly peaceful take over covered resistance from
volunteer armies, supported by China, and mostly composed of
bandits. With the purpose to oppose the intrusion of the Japanese
on what was once consider to be part of China, dissension came
not between the Kwantung Army and the “volunteers” but between
184
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these volunteers and the ordinary people.187 The volunteer army
was not alone in their willingness to attack to maintain their claim
to Manchuria. The Kwantung Army not only quickly put down
these attacks but put on hold their peaceful conquest to exhibit
their willingness to acquire Manchuria by force. The city of
Fushun saw much bloodshed as houses were burned and lives were
lost, all at the hands of the Kwantung Army. Blame for the
massacre was laid at the feet of the villagers when rebels had left
many Japanese dead. In reality, Fushun was one of many examples
of the Japanese’s strength and willingness to use brutal force as a
tool in the acquisition of Manchuria.188
For all Pu’yi’s attempts to restore the Manchus, it appeared
that the identity of the Manchus was slowly changing. It was not
changing to model a traditional Chinese culture, but a western one.
Pu’yi’s tutor after the 1911 fall was the English bred Reginald
Fleming Johnston, whose influence began to reshape Pu’yi.
Johnston’s influence came to touch every aspect of Pu’yi’s life,
from using a fork instead of chopsticks, to prizing wool instead of
the silks and satins of China. However, no greater influence, or
greater change for that matter, was as great as Johnston’s role in
the cutting of the queue. Despite the pleas of the republic over the
course of the years, one remark from Johnston referring to the
queues as “pigtails,” pushed Pu’yi shed the queue in 1919. Many
would follow within the Forbidden City.189 Pu’yi adopted an
English name, Henry, and so the transformation appeared to be in
the favor of modernization.
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Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston. China Institute in America.190

The outside world was changing. The 1900’s had brought
change in technology, fashion, thought, as well as political
structures. These changes were not central to nations such as the
United States or Europe. Rather, the ideas of modernization spread
as trade between the many nations expanded. As the modern world
put forth the image of the ideal style, the queue quickly lost its
place of importance, as did other traditional garb. Though
modernization had transformed the exterior side of the Manchu
identity, it did not transform its ideals. At the time when marriage
came into question, many encouraged the marriage of Pu’yi to a
Chinese girl, seeing it as a political strategy. However the desire to
“maintain the ‘purity’ of the royal bloodline too overpowering” in
order to compromise their beliefs for an upper hand.191 Even with
the policy of intermarriage put forth by Cixi, it was still a taboo for
a Manchu to marry a Chinese, especially if he should be wearing
the crown.
If there was to be one lasting physical trait that continued
for the Manchu identity, it would be the dress. After finally being
made emperor of Manchukuo, Pu’yi sent for the Qing imperial
190
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robes for his ascension to the throne. By doing so, Pu’yi marked
how heritage still held a place of honor among the Manchus.192
Pu’yi still claimed his lineage to the Aisin-Gioro clan of old,
whose opinion was of concern to Pu’yi when the Japanese rejected
his plan to wear the imperial robes. Pu’yi still held ties to AisinGioro just as he held ties to shaman practices. For as much as
modernity rejects these practices, on the day of his enthronement,
Pu’yi said a prayer while a “snow-white bull” was sacrificed and
the rising smoke of the altar symbolized “the transmission of his
prayers to the spirits of the dead.”193 Had the Manchus assimilated,
Confucianism would have been the major belief system, a belief
system that itself was faltering at the end of the Qing Dynasty and
blamed for the loss of the Opium War.194 Much of what was the
Chinese culture at the end of the Ming had fallen to modernity, as
outside and inside influences had changed as the definition
Chinese Culture during that time.195

Image of Pu’yi/Emperor, 1909-1911. China Institute in America.
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It was not only religious standards maintained but also
ideas about social stratification. The banner system, a core of
Manchu identity, had long lost its warrior side and thus was
replaced by Japan’s Kwantung Army as the main fighting force.197
However the banner system still remained. Upon his entry into
Hsinking on route to the throne Pu’yi was greeted by five
Manchukuo banners.198 If only ceremonial, the presence of the
banners, as well as claiming the Aisin-Gioro title, shows Pu’yi’s
and the Manchu’s connection to the past. While others followed
Pu’yi to modernization, others remained deeply loyal to the
Manchu ethnic identity and kept their queues when Pu’yi cut
his.199 In the end, the agreement between Japan and Manchukuo
spoke to certain guidelines to their relationship. For example, each
would respect the others territory and rights. None had the
allowance to cross the other’s borders or specifically, change those
borders. Also, Manchukuo was required to respect the rights,
interests, and treaties already established within Manchukuo at the
same time provide aid for each other if the need arises. The last
requirement made the presence of Japanese troops in Manchukuo
required.200 Japan’s take over not only overshadowed Manchu rule
but also their identity.
Outside forces offered different opinions on Manchukuo
and who the Manchus might be. In a news article that came out in
1934, one philosophy/economics professor from the United States,
Charles F. Stickle, spoke on the circumstances in Manchukuo.
While the article fails to address the actual lecture, it does mention
how the United States sees the Manchus. Not only does the
professor dress in “full regalia” but he is assisted by a woman, also
dressed in Manchu fashion, who plays the role as “his number one
wife.” “His wife” and he then “made obeisance to the incense altar
in the approved Manchu fashion, where a statue of Buddha and
197
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ancestral tablets were placed.”201 The article focused on the
different dress styles and the fact that having more than one wife
was the standard in Manchukuo instead of the circumstances in
Manchukuo, as the professor was playing the role as a second class
Manchu. However, the article shows that the Manchu’s ethnic
distinction still existed, even if it was not as prevalent as it had
once been. As one may recall, though the Manchus adopted the
religions of China, such as Buddhism and Confucianism,
shamanism was the core religion of the Manchus. Disregarding the
mention of the Buddha statue, the article mentions the act of
respect shown for the altar and to the ancestral tablets. Part of the
Shaman culture involved performing ceremonies or sacrifices to
spirits or ancestors to signal respect. This part of the Manchu
identity had not disappeared over the course of the years. Not only
did the United States observe this custom, but Pu’yi also exhibited
this cultural aspect as he made his way to the tomb of Nurhaci and
made an offering and said a prayer to his deceased ancestor.202
While conversion to the western religions was encouraged, the
Manchus held on to their own.
The U.S. did recognize the culture but, along with the
Chinese government, failed to recognize Manchukuo as
independent state. Part of the purpose of the Lytton Commission of
1933 was to address the current problems within Manchuria, and
its solutions to those problems. The administration of Manchuria
was created by the Chinese to protect it from neighboring nations
who would take advantage of the weak state, such as the Japanese.
The administration developed into a complex system, whose
purpose was to strengthen the internal government to defend itself.
. However, the understanding between China and Manchuria was
that “even during these political changes, the laws promulgated by
the Central government with reference to civil, financial and
judicial matters, were completely enforced as before.”203 The
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political changes, the Lytton Commission describes, is the move
from the Monarchial system of the past to the Republic, who
retained the power to make appointments over Manchuria, such as
the creation of a provincial government and its appointments in
1928.204 These powers, as well as its claim to Manchuria, came
from the argument that it not only was part of China but also based
on population. The Lytton Commission believed that the “term
immigrants” had been incorrectly used to describe those who had
made their way into Manchuria. Blaming this mistake on the
Japanese government, the Chinese government stated that since
most of the new residents had come from other parts of China, the
term that should be used is migrants.205 Seeing many of the
residents of Manchuria had come from China, the only logical
thought is China had governance rights to Manchuria.
Thomas Jefferson once stated, “We surely cannot deny to
any nation that right where on our own government is foundedthat every one may govern itself according to whatever form it
pleases… The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be
regarded.”206 It seems natural that the U.S. would then side with
the newly formed Manchukuo, seeing it as the will of the
government and its leader lies with its formation. However this
was not the case. On January 7, 1932, at the conclusion of the SinoJapanese war, U.S. representative Henry Stimson created the
Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition. The doctrine simply states
that “the United States ‘does not intend to recognize any situation,
treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means
contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of
August 27, 1928.”207 This included the creation of Manchukuo.
Few within the US, such as George Bronson Rea, saw this as going
against the core belief of the United States and how it came into
existence; if the people had of Manchukuo have recognized it as a
204
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state, follow its laws, then it is a state, “recognition does not create
the state,”208he reasoned.
Rea echoed the claims of the Manchus that Manchukuo, or
Pu’yi, were not Chinese. To the Chinese, Pu’yi was a traitor and
thus, they refused to recognize Manchukuo’s independence.209 As
stated by Rea, “no proof can be adduced to support the contention
that the Manchus have died out…”210 Even if the only recognized
Manchu was Pu’yi and his court, it is evidence against the idea that
all Manchus had ceased to exist. Due to the fact that Manchus still
exist, by example of Pu’yi and the anti-Manchuism of the time,
China had no right to Manchuria based on this claim. Furthermore,
by the time of the Japanese takeover, approximately three percent
of the population was made up of Manchus.211 Though their
numbers had decreased immensely since they first came into
power in 1644, action of tracking their population shows that the
Manchus were still a recognizable part of the population in China.
The parts of their ethnic identity they had kept were enough to
make a clear distinction between the Manchus and the Han. The
Han Chinese have always outnumbered the Manchus, a fact that
argued against Manchu rule. The Han could see no reason as to
why the minority ruled over the majority. Nor does it have a claim
to Manchuria based on immigration numbers. If this were so, the
U.S. would have lost Hawaii to Japan.212
The Manchus have long held the right of possession to
Manchuria as their homeland. The right to govern Manchuria
belongs to the Manchus.213 Manchuria has long been a place by
which to draw replacement troops from during conquest and a safe
haven. To preserve the purity of the Manchus in their homeland,
the Qing rulers barred all Chinese from entering and residing in
Manchuria, a ban that lasted until the end of the Qing rule.
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Furthermore, said purity was also ensured by the banning of
marriage between the bannermen and the Han. Any claim the
Chinese held in the past was removed with the Manchu occupation
during the Qing Dynasty.214 Rea’s claim against Chinese
sovereignty shows that even the Western forces were divided over
the question of whether Manchukuo was its own state and whether
or not the Manchus were its own people. At the same time, his
claims also showed that the Manchu were a recognized ethnic
group. The outsides, such as the United States or Europe, only
justification for its support of Han rule was they could not tell the
difference between the two.215 Then again, can one tell the
difference between an American and a Canadian? Physically no, as
was the case for the Manchus, once the queue was removed in
1919. Yet as seen, the traits that identified them as an ethnic group
were there and the fact that they still claimed to be Manchus also
showed that they did not belong to any other group.
Conclusion
By the end of World War II, Japan had lost it claim to Manchukuo
and the Manchus lost whatever false sense of power they held.
Manchukuo was absorbed back into China’s dominion and the
Manchus were officially recognized as a legal ethnic group in
1949. Despite their recognition, many believe that “when the
barbarian enters China (i.e. Chinese civilization) he becomes
Chinese.”216 Over the centuries the Manchu identity had changed.
Events such as the Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the 1898
Affair, the 1911 Revolution, and the rise of Manchukuo in 1932
have forced the Manchu identity to evolve. Yet while the Manchu
identity has changed, it has not disappeared.
In 1919, Pu’yi was the first Manchu to cut his queue, a long
standing symbol of Manchu identity and conquest. Many may look
at this as the Manchus’ move to assimilate. However the Manchus
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did not claim to be Chinese. Modernity had forced these changes,
not Chinese culture. The biggest influence on the Manchu identity
was an individual not of Chinese or Japanese nationality but an
Englishman by the name of Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston. For
sinicization to occur, one of Chinese culture must be present. The
biggest sign that the Manchu identity still remained separate were
the actions and beliefs of the Manchus and the Han.
The Manchus saw themselves to be different from the Han.
Part of the problem that arose was the generalization of the two
races, in part due to the opinions of outside forces, such as the U.S.
as seen from the newspaper clippings and special reports seen
throughout this paper. Over time the opinion may begin to become
fact but it disregards actual events and circumstances. The
Manchus were persistent on maintaining the border between
themselves and the Han. Part of this barrier was constructed of
biased testing, enforced hairstyle, and preferred treatment in
political and social aspects. The Manchus were not alone in their
desire to maintain ethnic borders. Just as the Manchus showed
their contempt for the Han by the violence of the Yangzhou
massacre, the Han showed that the border had lasted throughout
the Qing Dynasty by the violence of the 1911 Revolution. Even as
the twentieth century brought modernization, political change, as
the Manchus faced the loss of their native land, their grasp of their
identity did not falter. The only change in the identity of the
Manchus went from being based on physical elements and more to
an ideal and an ancestral connection. Until a law made it official,
the only sign of the recognition of separate identities was usually
through violence. Even with the confusion or the idea of their
sinicization, the Manchus, by their own recognition, maintained
their distinct ethnic identity, an identity that has lasted to this day.
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